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A Corporate Governance Reform as a
natural experiment for incentive contracts




In this paper, we exploit a major reform of the legal rules of corporate governance to
test for the incentive character of managerial contracts.
As such reforms are rare, this test is only possible with historical data. Therefore, we
employ a dataset from 19th century German banking using dynamic panel estimators.
Our main …ndings are–…rstly–that the compensation of executive o¢cers was strongly
dependent on …rm performance. Secondly, the 1884 reform of corporate
governance–which increased monitoring incentives and abilities of
shareholders–strongly reduced the pay-performance sensitivity. Hence, this …nding
strongly supports the hypothesis of incentive related pay.
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One of the …rst and probably best known applications of principal-agent theory
is incentive contracts for managers of publicly owned companies. From theory,
managers should be paid according to …rm-performance. Yet, the empirical
support for this is rather weak. In their seminal article Jensen and Murphy
(1990) …nd that compensation of CEOs increases only by 3.25$ per 1000$ in-
crease in shareholders’ wealth.1 Given Jensen and Murphy’s results the question
arises whether the pay-performance sensitivity was always that low or if it has
changed over time. And if the sensitivity has changed due to an evolving in-
stitutional environment, this gives additional insight on the incentive problems
within the …rm. We address this issue by analyzing the impact of a large corpo-
rate governance reform—the 1884 German joint stock companies act—on the
pay-performance relationship within the German banking sector.
This act strictly separated control rights between the supervisory and the
executive board of a company and still builds the backbone of the modern
German corporate governance code. As the reform aimed at solving problems
of corporate control, we can expect moral hazard be of lesser importance in
the period after 1884 and the pay-performance link to be much lower. Indeed,
we …nd the pay-performance link to be 50% smaller in the post-reform pe-
riod. Conversely, the lower post-reform pay-performance sensitivity serves as
evidence for incentive-contracts before the reform, i.e. the reform itself is a
natural experiment.
1Hall and Liebman (1998) …nd a larger sensitivity for a more recent period. Zhou (2000)
analyses Canadian data and Kato (1997) analyses Japanese data. Both report sensitivities
that are somewhat larger than what Jensen and Murphy report.
Core et al. (2003) give a review of the recent literature on stock-based Executive Com-
pensation and incentives. Murphy (1999) gives an excellent and very general review of the
literature concerning incentive related pay for managers and John and Qian (2003) review
the CEO-compensation literature with special focus on the banking industry. Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) give a general survey of the literature on corporate governance.
As we will analyse German data, one may wonder if for modern German data the sensi-
tivity of pay to performance is much di¤erent to the one for the US. Indeed, the dependency
of managerial salaries on pro…ts is also reported to be rather weak for Germany (See e.g.
Schwalbach and Graßho¤, 1997, or Kraft and Niederprüm, 1999a and 1999b). For the period
analysed, contemporaries criticised the high salaries of managers and the low dependency of
manager-salaries on performance (Warschauer 1902).
1It is essential to exploit inter-…rm or inter-time di¤erences in pay-performance
sensitivities. Only if these di¤erences are linked to changes respectively to di¤er-
ences in the institutional or market environment one can obtain a causal inter-
pretation of the pay-performance relationship itself. Himmelberg and Hubbard
(2000) or Grossmann (2003) for example argue that general-equilibrium e¤ects
already induce some correlation between performance and pay even without any
strategic considerations when able managers are scarce. Alternatively, Lazaer
(2003) explains the pay-performance sensitivity as a selection device.
One way to empirically asses the importance of incentive reasons for a pay-
performance sensitivity, i.e. to test the principal-agent model, is the use of
the volatility of …rm returns. The higher this volatility, the higher the salary-
based pay-performance sensitivity should be. Empirical evidence for this is
mixed. Aggarwal and Samwick’s (1999) results are supportive for the principal
agent theory, whereas Garen (1994) and Lambert and Larker (1987) do not …nd
strongly signi…cant di¤erences between high-volatility and low-volatility …rms.
One reason for this might be the use of short panels. Managerial contracts
are typically multi-period and involve reputation and therefore the dynamic
structure of the data is of importance. Simply using …xed- or random-e¤ects
OLS estimators might lead to biased results. Using historical data allows us to
employ a panel that is long in time dimension. We explicitly take into account
the below unit-root autoregressive nature of manager compensation and use the
G M M - e s t i m a t o ro fA r r e l l a n oa n dB o n d( 1 9 9 1 ) .
As the legal system de…nes the deep parameters that are embedded in the
optimal contracts of managers, large changes in the corporate governance code
can be used as a test. Large changes in the corporate control code are naturally
rare. However, we have a unique data-set that contains accounting data of 9
large German banks covering the period from 1871 to 1910; a period in which
the joint-stock company act of 1884 falls. This act is arguably one of the most
fundamental reforms the German corporate governance code has undergone
so far. Especially, we can expect a legal change in corporate governance to
in‡uence the sensitivity of pay with respect to …rm-performance. And—as
2said before— we …nd this sensitivity to be substantially in‡uenced by the legal
reform analyzed.
A similar approach has been implemented by Conyon (1997). He analyzes
the impact of voluntary changes in corporate governance on the level of CEO
compensation for a sample of UK …rms. His results suggest a rather weak in‡u-
ence of these corporate governance innovations on compensation. In contrast,
Core et al. (1999) …nd a substantial in‡uence of corporate governance on the
compensation-level. Additionally, they show that weaker corporate governance
not only increases the level of compensation, but also decreases future …rm
performance.
The remainder of this paper is now organized as follows. In section 2, we
motivate our identi…cation strategy with a highly stylized model of an incentive
contract. Moreover, we describe the major legal-institutional shifts of the 1884
legal-reform of the corporate governance code. Section 3 describes the data set,
and section 4 presents the estimation model and the empirical results. Section
5 concludes.
2 Theoretical and historical preconsiderations
2.1 Incentive contracts
To formalize the basic idea of this paper in a very stylized way, suppose a …rm
generates pro…ts employing a manager. This manager derives utility from her
salary, w, which may depend on the pro…ts she reports to the owner of the …rm.
Additionally, the manager can divert …rm resources s; which are drawn from
…rm pro…ts, ¼; to private projects (perks) at some private costs g. Hence, her
utility function is U = s ¡ g(s;¼)+w(¼;s). For simplicity, the only contracts
available shall be linear in the reported pro…ts, i.e. w = ®0 + a(¼ ¡ s).2
The owner chooses a to maximize her pro…ts (¼ ¡ s)(1¡ a). The manager
2Burhop (2003) shows in a historical case study from 19th century German banking that
the contracts used were indeed linear .
3will chose s according to her …rst-order condition.
1 ¡ g0 (s;¼) ¡ w0 (¼ ¡ s)=0 : (1)
If g is quadratic, i.e. g =
c(s¡b¼)2






so the optimal fraction of the reported pro…ts, the manager gets is decreasing
in the costs of mis-reporting. Therefore a legal reform that increases these cost
will lower the fraction of pro…ts the manager appropriates.3
Similarly, we can expect the tenure of a manager to a¤ect the pay-performance
sensitivity: If a manager that stays longer with the …rm has a lower cost of di-
verting funds, then her pro…t-share will be larger. Because of that, both of
these two e¤ects can be used to test for the incentive character of performance
related pay.
2.2 The 1884 joint-stock company act as a natural experiment
To see that the 1884 reform can be viewed as a natural experiment indeed, we
may shortly describe the historical and legal setting: The legislation of joint-
stock companies during the 19th century in Germany can be divided into three
phases.4 The …rst phase starts with the introduction of the Prussian joint-
stock companies act in 1838 (for railways) and 1843 (for all other companies).
According to these laws, a royal concession was necessary to found such a
company and the concessioned companies were supervised by the government.
The second phase, in which the so-called ”Gründerboom” of 1871-73 falls,
began with a major liberalization of the legal rules concerning joint-stock com-
panies in 1870. Founding a joint-stock company was from then on possible
without royal concession and the system of state supervision was disestablished,
3Analogously, the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) optimal linear contract model yields a
similar result, when the reform in‡uences the curvature of the disutility of e¤ort.
4Hopt (1980) gives a short overview on this.
4but a two tier board system was introduced. The minimum nominal face-value
of shares issued was reduced to 100 M, of which only 40 per cent had to be
paid up. This popularized stock-ownership in Germany. Between 1871 and
1873 more than 900 joint-stock companies—over of 100 of them banks—were
founded in Germany.
However, in a sense the liberalization went too far: there was no clear-
cut division of competence between executive and supervisory board (Vorstand
and Aufsichtsrat); many of the new companies were unsoundly managed, and
therefore the failure rate after the stock-market crash of 1873 was immense.
According to contemporaries, the defective law was the main reason for the
collapse (see e.g. Glagau 1877).
Following the stock-market-crash of 1873 the laws concerning corporate gov-
ernance underwent a major reform in 1884 (see for instance Ring 1890).5 For
the …rst time, the new law strictly separated the functions of the supervisory
and executive board. Moreover, the minimum face value of a share was in-
creased to 1,000 M, the shares had to be paid up in full,6 all shareholders got
a voting right, and detailed pro…t- and loss-statements had to be published.
This increased the monitoring incentives and abilities of shareholders signi…-
cantly. Finally, the penalties for misbehavior of supervisory or executive board
members were considerably raised.
If managerial compensation was sensitive to performance to induce the right
incentives before the reform, we can expect the decline in discretionary power
and the higher costs of misbehavior after the reform to lower this sensitivity.
Hence, we can use the reform as a natural experiment.
5The importance of good corporate governance rules was already recognized by contempo-
rary authors, e.g. Philippovich (1909, pp 186) who proposed that monitoring incentives should
be strenghted by a high face value of stocks, free speech on the annual meeting of shareholders,
clear accounting rules, and extensive control rights even for minority shareholders.
6This made holding a diversi…ed portfolio rather infeasible, as the average net-national
product per capita was 400 M in 1884.
53 Brief description of the data-set
The main source of data used for this paper is Bosenick (1912) with detailed
information for nine large German joint-stock credit banks (Kreditbanken).7 In
1910, the last year for which data are reported, these banks had total assets of
nearly 7.9 billion Mark and they represented a market share of about 52 per
cent of the German joint-stock credit-bank market.
Bosenick reports the pro…t shares paid to the executive- and supervisory-
board. It is important to note that these two boards were strictly separated
only in 1884. Furthermore, one bank—the Schaa¤hausensche Bankverein—did
not report separate pro…t shares for executive and supervisory board members
until 1905. Therefore, only the total bonus payments to the supervisory and
executive board members are used in the regressions. As the size of the board
varies, we calculate the average bonus per member of the board.8 In addition,
we have data on the accounting pro…ts, the share price (relative to the face-value
of a share), and the dividend of the nine banks.9
Table 1 gives a summary statistics of our de‡ated data. Table 2 presents
the results, we obtain from a Maddala-Wu (1999) Fisher tests for unit-roots.10
We can reject the hypothesis of a common unit-root both for pro…ts and the
price of stocks on all usual levels of signi…cance. As the banking sector could
be expected to grow for the time-period we analyze, we allow for a trend.
For the managers’ bonus, our variable of most interest, however, the evi-
dence is mixed. Formally, we cannot reject the unit-root hypothesis. Yet, this
7Note for the referee: See appendix.
8These information is taken from Reitmayer (1999).
9All data has been de‡ated to 1913-prices using the implicit NNP de‡ator of Ho¤mann
(1965, pp 825). In addition we also have data on the total assets and subcategories and on
total lending. Yet, these items display unit-root behaviour and so are not included in any of
our empirical speci…cations.
The data series start in 1871, but German accounting rules did not prescribe the publication
of pro…t-loss statements until 1884. Therefore, …rst pro…t statements of the Schaa¤hausensche
Bankverein are available for 1884; the Disconto Gesellschaft published …rst data in 1885. Data
series for the Dresdner Bank and for the Nationalbank für Deutschland start in the year of
foundation of the respective banks (1873 and 1881).
All members of the board had to be shareholders, too. However, there is no information
available on how many shares each board member holds.
10The test bases on an ADF-Statistics for each individual bank, allowing for variable lag-
length, which has been determined using a LM-Test.
6Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Stock-Price (in %) 320 116.5 33.15 45.37 256.4
Dividends (1000M) 320 4664 4329 0.00 24325
Pro…t (1000M) 320 5998 5785 -3118 31671
Bonus-Payments (1000M) 320 720.0 794.6 0.00 4804
Table 2: Signi…cance of a unit-root,
Maddala-Wu (1999) Fisher-Test
Variable With No. of individual
Trend rejections at 10%
Pro…t 0% 4
Bonus 37.50% 2
Bonus (break-adjusted) 8.10% 3
Stock-Price 0% 8
may well be due to a structural break in 1884 when the new laws were intro-
duced. Hence, we estimate the direct impact of the reform on the rewards,
specifying the rewards as an AR(1) with …xed bank e¤ects and a trend. More-
over, we include a dummy for the post-reform e¤ect. When we subtract the
estimate of the reform-dummy from our original rewards-series, we can clearly
reject the hypothesis of a unit-root at the 10% level. This result can also be
interpreted as some …rst indicator of a structural break indeed taking place in
1884. Moreover, in our more structural estimations (below), the autoregressive
parameter is signi…cantly smaller than one.
4 Empirical results
Our empirical model directly builds upon the assumption of a linear contract.
Hence, we specify
wit = ®0i + a1¼it + ®2¼itIt¸1885 + ¯xit + °zt + uit (3)
in which wit is the average bonus paid to the members of the board. ¼it is the
pro…t of …rm i at time t, xit are other individual covariates and zt denotes a
vector of aggregate covariates. I is an indicator function that takes value one
for the years after the reform year 1884.
7I no u rv e c t o ro fc o v a r i a t e sxit we also include an interaction term for pro…ts
and the average time the members of the board have spent on the board. This
term represents the experience of the board members. We can expect the
parameter for this term to be positive for two reasons: Firstly, if the board
members get more experienced and build up more …rm-speci…c human capital,
their in‡uence on the banks pro…ts gets larger. Secondly, more experienced
managers can be expected to divert bank resources to private projects more
easily. Hence, they have to be compensated by a larger fraction of the pro…ts
for not doing so.
Econometrically, two problems may complicate our analysis. The …rst one is
that bonus payments are bounded by zero, so that a Tobit-model would be ap-
propriate. However, there are not too many observations in the censored region,
so that a Panel-Tobit and a random-e¤ects model do not yield substantial dif-
ferences (both not reported). The other problem is the dynamic structure of our
data, which we have to take into account as the unit-root hypothesis is clearly
rejected.11 If the error term is autocorrelated, i.e. uit = ½uit¡1 +»it +½®0i; the
estimation equation becomes
wit = ½wit¡1 + ®0i +( a1 + ®2It¸1885)¼it ¡ ½(a1 + ®2It¸1885)¼it¡1
+ ¯xit ¡ ¯½xit¡1 + °zt ¡ °½zt¡1 + »it;
= ½wit¡1 + ®0i +( a1 + ®2It¸1885)¼it ¡ (µ1 + µ2It¸1885)¼it¡1
+ ¯xit ¡ µ3xit¡1 + °zt ¡ µ4zt¡1 + »it: (4)
As the reform was intended to improve corporate governance structures, we
expect ®2 > 0: Moreover, we expect tenure to increase the pay-performance
sensitivity.
We use the Arrellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, to estimate this
equation in a …rst step. This estimator does not make use of the parameter
constraints between (½;®;µ;°). The regression results are presented in Table 3.
11Although it would be generally speaking possible to adress both the censored regression
and the dynamics-problem at once, e.g. using CLAD, the sample size makes this approach
infeasible.
8Table 3: Arrelano-Bond-Estimator
One-step estimator, One-step estimator,
Bonus including stock-prices including aggregate variables
coe¢cient std. error coe¢cient std. error
L.Bonus 0.7096*** 0.0355 0.6308*** 0.0360
Pro…t 0.0288*** 0.0040 0.0303*** 0.0045
L.Pro…t -0.0183*** 0.0043 -0.0026 0.0052
Reform -0.0128*** 0.0038 -0.0100*** 0.0038
L.Reform 0.0085** 0.0038 0.0075** 0.0038
Experience 0.0009*** 0.0002 0.0011*** 0.0002





Trend 1.1567 0.5855 -1.7052 1.4198
NNP -0.0008 0.0030
L.NNP 0.0054 0.0029
Stock Market Index 0.0664 0.2516 -0.3373 0.3654
L. SMI -0.3291 0.2337 -0.3592 0.2504
Real interest rate (i) -1.8149 1.6698
L.i -1.2900 1.4378
Consistency Tests statistics P-Value statistics P-Value
Sargan Â2(741) 376.13 1 359.09 1
Second order
autocorrelation 1.13 0.257 0.9 0.3656
***/**/* indicate signi…cance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level
We included the stock-market index, NNP, and the real interest rate as
controls for the aggregate state of the economy. Yet, none of them entered
signi…cantly. Moreover, we alternatively include dividends paid and the price
of the bank’s stocks in the set of regressors.12
The Sargan-test cannot reject the null of overidenti…cation and so does the
second-order autocorrelation-test not reject the null of no autocorrelation. So,
12We also tried other speci…cations, including the interaction of the share-price volatility
and the pro…ts (at annual frequencies, before and after the reform separately), we excluded
the banks that appear in the sample only after the reform, treated experience as endogenous,
and used the two-step procedure of Arrelano and Bond (1991). Another speci…cation included
total asset value as regressor and proxy for …rm size. However, we excluded this variable from
the …nal set of regressors as it exhibits a unit-root. Qualitatively, the results did not change
across all di¤erent speci…cations.
Bonus payments were used instead of total compensation as only data on the bonus-part is
available.
9Table 4: Baltagi-Wu Estimator
Bonus Fixed E¤ects
coe¢cient std. Err. p-value
Pro…t 0.0284 0.0049 0.000
Reform-E¤ect -0.0140 0.0045 0.002
Experience 0.0004 0.0002 0.027
Stock-Price 1.0644 0.3067 0.001
SMI -0.1126 0.2680 0.675
Constant -108.90 7.71 0.000
½ 0.7827 P-Value
Hausmann-test Statistics 58.6 0
our model seems to be well speci…ed.
The estimated parameters for the lagged independent variables are rela-
tively close the values implied by the parameter-constraints from the AR(1)-
disturbance model. Hence, we also estimate (4) using the AR(1) panel estimator
of Baltagi and Wu (1999). These estimates are reported in Table 4.
Here, a Hausmann-test clearly rejects the random e¤ects model, so that we
take the …xed-e¤ects Baltagi-Wu estimates as our most preferred ones. Yet the
Arrellano-Bond estimates do not qualitatively di¤er.
An increase in pro…ts of 1000M increases the salary of the typical member
of the board by 28.4M in the pre-reform period.13 However, the 1884-reform
already halved the sensitivity. Insofar, we can clearly reject the hypothesis, that
the contracts in the pre-reform period were not incentive related. Moreover, we
…nd the tenure-e¤ect to be also positive as predicted. Although the price of
the bank’s stocks enters the remuneration statistically signi…cant, economicly
it seems of lesser importance as the stock price’s unit of measure is percent of
the nominal value of equity.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have used a fundamental reform of the corporate governance
code—the 1884 joint-stock company act in Germany—to test for incentive con-
tracts. We …nd the pre-reform pay-performance sensitivity to be statistically
13Compared to the e¤ect Jensen and Murphy (1990) found for modern US CEO-
compensations, this is 8-times larger and may therefore be considered as substantial
10signi…cant and economically important. As the reform about halved this sensi-
tivity, we can attribute a substantial fraction of the sensitivity found to incen-
tives. As for the post-reform period, naturally we can not exactly di¤erentiate
between general-equilibrium and incentive e¤ects in the pay performance sen-
sitivity. Yet, the large impact the reform itself has points towards a substantial
incentive proportion in the sensitivity found, as the reform can be expected to
not have wiped out all problems of corporate control but only a substantial
fraction.
Our results may also be interpreted in another direction: Given the low pay-
performance sensitivity typically found in studies that use modern data, that is
data from a well established system of corporate governance, inducing managers
to exert e¤ort seems not to be the major problem for the principal, but rather
directing this e¤ort to pro…table activities is the main point of concern.
At least our results should make cautious when interpreting increases in
the pay-performance sensitivity as improvements for the shareholders. Such
increases might well re‡ect a worsening of institutions of corporate governance.
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5 I x u w k h uL q i r u p d w l r qr qw k hg d w d
Wkh edqnv lqfoxghg lq wkh vdpsoh duh= Vfkddkdxvhqvfkhu Edqnyhuhlq/ Edqn
iÿu Kdqgho xqg Lqgxvwulh/ Glvfrqwr0Jhvhoovfkdiw/ Ehuolqhu Kdqghov0Jhvhoovfkdiw/
4Plwwhoghxwvfkh Fuhglwedqn/ Ghxwvfkh Edqn/ Frpphu}0 xqg Glvfrqwredqn/
Guhvgqhu Edqn/ Qdwlrqdoedqn iÿu Ghxwvfkodqg1
Wkhuhiruh lq frpsdulvrq zlwk rwkhu uhfhqw vwxglhv rxu vdpsoh lv vpdoo
dorqj wkh furvv0vhfwlrqdo glphqvlrq1 Lq d vhqvh lw lv qrw udqgrp dv lw kdv d
eldv wrzdug odujh edqnv1 Dqrwkhu vkruwfrplqj duh wkh plvvlqj lqirupdwlrq
derxw wkh {hg ru edvlf vdodulhv ri wkh h{hfxwlyhv1 Ixuwkhupruh/ lw lv qrw
srvvleoh wr jxuh rxw krz wkh erqxvhv zhuh glvwulexwhg zlwklq wkh erdug1
Vhh Exukrs +5336, rq wkhvh srlqwv1
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